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AN ETHOS OF LYING
Paul Butler*
I.

INTRODUCTION: "PRECEDENCE OVER TRUTHFULNESS"

When I purchased my copy of Understanding Lawyers' Ethics,' I heard the
predictable jokes. A law professor in line behind me said, "That must be a very
thin book." "Yeah," added the sales clerk, "or maybe the inside pages are
blank." To be polite, I laughed, although actually I thought the jokes were tired.
My laugh was a lie.
I lie like that sometimes, for social reasons. In my scholarship I have endorsed
lying in certain cases for political and pragmatic reasons. 2 In both contexts I have
considered morality, but ignored ethics.
The moral case for social lies (as a race theorist, I love that they are called
"white" lies) is easy. I can't imagine that heaven is full of people who answered
truthfully when their elderly aunt asked, "How do you like my pistachio jello
mold?" Those kinds of lies seem too commonplace and too inconsequential to
deserve an ethos, other than that everybody does it.
The moral case for the political-pragmatic lies I recommend in my academic
writing is more complicated. I construct an argument from religion and natural
law (by way of criminal law doctrine) that I hope is persuasive.3
Now comes UnderstandingLawyers' Ethics to remind us of the primacy of the
ethical case, and even to suggest a framework for an ethos of lying. According to
the authors, Monroe H. Freedman and Abbe Smith, "There are moral values
that, for us, may take precedence over truthfulness. One is human life, for example, the innocent person on death row.", 4 Thus, a lawyer could morally violate
her pledge of confidentiality to a client in order to save an "innocent" life. In a
similar vein, the authors criticize "ethical rules that place a higher value on telling
the truth to the court than on saving innocent human life." 5
It is unclear whether Freedman and Smith emphasize the sanctity of "innocent" life because that presents the most sympathetic case in which to defend
lying, or because they have a different ethical assessment of lying to save the life
of a guilty person. In other writing, however, Professor Freedman has been more
expansive on this subject.
* Professor, George Washington University Law School.
1 MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS ( 2 ' ed. 2002).
2 See Paul Butler, By Any Means Necessary: Using Violence and Subversion to Change Unjust
Law, 50 UCLA L. REV. 721 (2003).
3 Id. at 745-47.
4 FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 1, at 165-66.
5 Id. at 219.
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In an article in the Fordham Law Review, Freedman discusses the dilemma of
a friend who was disappointed that he could never serve on a death penalty jury.
When asked on the questionnaire for potential jurors, Freedman's friend-a
rabbi-honestly reported his opposition to capital punishment. In the jurisdiction where he lived people with such beliefs were automatically disqualified. 6
Freedman writes,
I suggested to my friend that his conduct was inconsistent with his asserted
moral priorities. The preservation of human life was not paramount for
him-telling the truth to the jury commission was. Because of his scruples
about answering the questionnaire truthfully, he had been making it impossible for him to serve on a jury and, as a juror, to vote against death.7
The story has a happy ending: "After reflection, my friend decided to lie on
the next jury questionnaire." 8 Freedman is carefully agnostic. He does not say
whether he would have lied in such a situation; he merely provides ethical counsel to the rabbi. Freedman understands that many people would "find lying to a
court to be a shocking matter ...[but his] point is that religion doesn't 'answer'
such dilemmas-not, at any rate, in a predictable or consistent way." 9
Providing predictable, consistent answers is the job of ethics, if not religion. In
this essay I consider the case for lying by attorneys to clients, and also lying by
potential jurors to get on juries. As a framework for this analysis, I will use the
ethos of subversion described in Understanding Criminal Law-the rules for
when it is okay to break the rules. To begin I will explain my usage of two terms:
"ethos" and "lying."
It would overstate Freedman and Smith's ambition to term their analysis of
lying an "ethos." Their defense of lying is a minor part of their book, but it is
consistent with the whole in that it approaches, in a careful, nuanced way, the
problems that lawyers face in the real world. I admire the authors' application of
principle to practice. They demand the best from lawyers, and they suggest that
this will require lawyers to break promises to clients in rare cases. The authors
don't dwell on these exceptional cases, and accordingly my description of a
Freedman/Smith ethos of lying makes reasonable inferences from their statements and examples. I hope that my analysis is as careful and deliberate as
Freedman and Smith's.

6 Monroe H. Freedman, Religion Is Not Totally Irrelevant to Legal Ethics, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
1299, 1300 (1998).
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
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II.

THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF LYING

The attorney conduct that Freedman and Smith defend is breaking a promise
of confidentiality to a client and discrediting the testimony of a truthful witness.
Even if that conduct is generally wrong, why is it lying? The best answer is because Freedman and Smith say that it is.10 One could fairly couch these practices
in other terms, but lying is also a fair description.1 1 It is a testament to the quality
of Freedman's and Smith's scholarship that they pose for themselves the hard
case, rather than the easier case.
In Chapter 6, Freedman and Smith state that when a lawyer pledges confidentiality to her client, she is morally bound to abide by that promise.1 2 Then, however, the authors announce three exceptions-"moral values that take
precedence over truthfulness., 13 They would break their promise to their client
(1) to save a human life, (2) to avoid having to go to trial before a corrupted
judge or jury, or (3) to defend themselves against formalized charges of unlawful
or unprofessional conduct. 14 The Freedman-Smith ethos is situational. Lies are
not immoral on some absolute basis.'5
Freedman and Smith's first principle of ethical lying is that the lie must be
justified. Freedman and Smith present three justifications: to save life, to prevent
judicial or juror corruption, and to allow a lawyer to defend herself against formal
charges. The authors wax eloquent about the first two exceptions: the first is
justified because human life is valuable,16 and the second because corrupt judges
or jurors subvert the justice system itself (again, the irony of lawyer subversion to
prevent client subversion). They seem defensive about the third exception. They
allow that "it is more difficult to defend than the first two," but extract some
10 FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 1, at 165 -66 (equating violating.a pledge of confidentiality
to a client with being untruthful) and at 216 (describing impeaching a truthful [rape] victim as communicating "a vicious lie to the jury and to the community"). See also id. at 220 ("One can agree with
[former United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren] Burger that lying is wrong, and still not
know the answer to the question of whether it is worse to lie to the client or to allow the client to lie
to the court."). For an in-depth analysis of lawyer lying to clients, see Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to
Clients, 138 U. PA. L.REv. 659 (1990).
11 The philosopher Sissela Bok defines a lie as "any intentionally deceptive message which is
stated." SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 14 (1979). Freedman
and Smith say they would not warn clients in advance that they might break their vow of confidentiality. Their first example for why such warnings are not necessary is that the warnings might discourage
a client from providing information which, if disclosed, could save an innocent life. FREEDMAN &
SMITH, supra note 1, at 166. This example demonstrates how the lawyer's promise of confidentiality
to the client, without stating the exceptions, is a lie, in the Bok sense.
12 FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 1, at 165.
13 Id. at 165-66.
14 Id. at 166.
15 See id. at 219-20 (critiquing legal absolutism).
16 See id. at 220 ("[T]here is something wrong with a system of morality that places a higher
value on truth-telling than on the preservation of an innocent person's life.").
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moral high ground from the fact that they would not permit 17
a breach of confidentiality to collect a fee, even though the model code would.
It is important to Freedman and Smith that the circumstances in which they
would allow the lawyer to violate her pledge of confidentiality will rarely occur.
They state that the likelihood of the contingencies is "slight," and that few lawyers would ever be confronted with those problems. 18 Even though a lawyer may
ethically violate confidentiality to defend herself against formal charges, this scenario "is sufficiently uncommon to permit an exception without significant systemic threat." 19 Hence, a second principle for the ethos: A necessary condition
of lying is that it be limited-the occasions for which it is justified must occur
rarely.
20
The final principle for ethical lying is based on "system utilitarianism.
Under this scheme, the ethical lawyer should consider the wisdom of following
2
the rules "in the context of her role in our constitutionalized adversary system." '
If, in a particular case, following a rule actually defeats the principle embodied by
the rule and "harms the system," then the lawyer is not ethically bound to follow
the rule. The example they proffer is a defense attorney who wishes to discredit a
truthful witness to a crime. The reason the lawyer knows the witness is truthful is
because the lawyer and her client have been able to communicate honestly. If
honest communications between the two would impede effective examinations of
witnesses, then honest communications are discouraged-a net loss for the system. This is too high a price, in the opinion of Freedman and Smith. Thus the
dishonesty implicit in discrediting a truthful witness should be tolerated. Lying is
justified when it upholds the values of the justice system more than truth telling
would.
Il.

LYING FOR LAYPERSONS

Professors Freedman and Smith, in their treatise on lawyers' ethics, have constructed a careful, principled defense of lawyers who lie, if they do so with good
reason, rarely, and if the lies promote a better system of justice than would exist
if the lawyers did not lie. But why should lawyers have all the fun? Can other
actors in the legal system engage in ends-justified rule breaking, and should the
same ethos apply?
17 Id. at 166, n.52. Their defense of breaching confidentiality to defend against formal charges
is premised on two ideas: first, that it is unfair to require one to be self-destructive and second, that "it
seems implicit" if the client is going to betray the lawyer.
18

Id. at 166.

19 Id. (Defining systemic threat as "significant likelihood that the existence of this exception
would make clients fearful of confiding in their lawyers.").
20 Id. at 221.
21 Id.
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In an article in the UCLA Law Review, I consider the dilemma of people who
believe that the death penalty and crack cocaine laws discriminate against African Americans, when they are summoned for jury duty in those cases.22 If the
potential jurors are honest about their beliefs, they will not be impaneled as jurors. So I recommend that they lie. Once on the jury, they should use their
power to prevent the application of discriminatory law. The juror in the capital
case should, if the case reaches the sentencing phase, vote for life imprisonment
rather than death. In the crack cocaine case, the juror should acquit the defendant, since that is her only power to ensure that the defendant escapes discriminatory punishment.
Applying the Freedman/Smith ethos to these cases is possible, but not easy.
System utilitarianism requires balancing competing values to determine which
more closely replicate the values in the criminal justice system. In my hypothetical, we choose between jurors who are entirely truthful and jurors who thwart the
application of a discriminatory law. We cannot have both. A fair system of criminal justice depends on both honest jurors and non-discriminatory laws. It is difficult to know which is most important. Perhaps the degree of discrimination
matters. In a capital case, race discrimination leads to death, whereas in a crack
case it "only" leads to excessive punishment. Freedman and Smith's book affirms, more than once, the primacy of human life.23 If life is the most important
value, then lying in a death penalty case is justified.
The juror in a crack cocaine case does not save a life. The best argument that
her lie is justified under the Freedman-Smith ethos is that her lie is analogous to
the lawyer who lies to prevent corruption, if one views a discriminatory law as
"corrupt." This is, for me, a persuasive argument, but I accept that reasonable
people can disagree (especially because the crack law is not officially or legally
corrupt-according to most courts disparate punishment for crack cocaine offenses does not offend equal protection).
In addition to the principles of system utilitarianism and justification, an important part of the Freedman-Smith ethos is that the occasions on which lawyers
would have to lie should rarely occur. Freedman and Smith believe that lawyers
almost never face cases in which a client reveals information which would save an
innocent person from death row or expose judicial corruption or provide a defense for the lawyer against ethical charges. The rarity of the occasions on which
an attorney could ethically lie would prevent the lies from being a systemic
threat.

22 Butler, supra note 2.
23 Though they emphasize "innocent" life in the treatise, Freedman, as noted above, has defended lying to get on juries in capital cases, presumably even if the life sought to be saved is not
"innocent."
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The opportunities for potential jurors to lie in death and cocaine cases proba-

bly would not be as rare. Substantial numbers of Americans oppose the death
penalty, and large numbers of African Americans oppose disparate punishment
for crack cocaine as well. Indeed in the UCLA Law Review article,24 the very
purpose of the juror subversive action I recommend is to threaten the system-to
get the death penalty and crack cocaine laws changed, through a kind of civil
disobedience. But, to quibble with one of the Freedman-Smith principles, why
should our ethical assessment of an act depend on how frequently the act occurs?
The implication is that it could be ethical for one or two starving men to steal
bread from the supermarket, but if too many starving men steal, then stealing
becomes unethical. Although I agree with Freedman and Smith that there is an
important situational component to ethics, I don't know if the number of people
who commit an act is an important aspect of assessing its ethical nature.
Professors Freedman, Smith, and I share a belief that breaking rules occasionally is more ethical than following rules. Perhaps only law professors would create rules for subversion! I hope what is embodied in both my efforts and the
efforts of Professors Freedman and Smith is a special respect for people who try

to achieve justice in the most difficult cases.

24

Butler, supra note 2.

